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Jones: A More Perfect Nation: Ending Racial Profiling

A MORE PERFECT NATION: ENDING RACIAL
PROFILING
Russell L. Jones*
[O]ur country must abandon all the habits of racism, because
we cannot carry the message of freedom and the baggage of
bigotry at the same time.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quote from the second inaugural address of President
George W. Bush is a reminder to Americans that all is not well on the
“home front.” Semblances of the denial of liberty and freedom that
President Bush’s address deplores in other countries still exist in
America. Images from the natural disaster in Louisiana caused by
Hurricane Katrina emphasize the disdain that America has shown for
her poor, who are mostly black and brown.2
A recent Texas study indicates that in certain areas in the United
States, blacks and Latinos are searched at higher rates than Anglos
following a traffic stop.3
The traffic stop, the basis for most
investigations resulting in racial profiling, although legal, is usually a
*
J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center. Special thanks to
Professor Sanjay Chhablani, Syracuse University School of Law for his comments and
constructive criticism. Also, I would like to thank my research assistant Brandy Citizen.
1
President George W. Bush, Address at the 55th Inaugural Ceremony (Jan. 20, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html.
2
Yahoo!News Photo, In the USA, Whites Find and Blacks Loot (Jan. 23, 2006),
http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2005/Whites-Find-Blacks-Loot30aug05.htm.
Two
photos released on the same day, one of a white couple carrying food, and the other of a
black man doing the same, were heavily circulated throughout the media and internet for
their controversial captions. The first picture stated that the “[t]wo residents wade through
chest-deep water after finding bread and soda from a local grocery store . . . ” Id. Yet the
second picture, although synonymous to the first, stated that the young black man “walks
through chest deep flood water after looting a grocery . . . ” Id. This serves as just one of
many instances where the media alone negatively depicts people of color and continues to
promote racial profiling. Id.
3
“Blacks and Latinos in Texas were significantly more likely than Anglos to be
searched following a traffic stop by Texas law enforcement agencies in 2002: approximately
6 of every 7 law enforcement agencies reported racial disparities between non-Anglo and
Anglo search rates.” DWIGHT STEWARD, STEWARD RES. GROUP, TEX. CRIM. JUSTICE REFORM
COAL., RACIAL PROFILING: TEXAS TRAFFIC STOPS AND SEARCHES—A FIRST LOOK AT THE
NATION’S MOST COMPREHENSIVE RACIAL PROFILING DATASET 10 (Feb. 2004),
http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/racial_profiling/2004_rp_report.p
df [hereinafter STEWARD, RACIAL PROFILING] (emphasis omitted); see also DAVID A. HARRIS,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S
HIGHWAYS 2 (June 1999), available at http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/
15912pub19990607.html [hereinafter HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK].
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pretext used by police officers to search for drugs in situations where
there is no other legitimate basis to conduct the search. Additionally,
cases indicate that border patrol officers stop people of Mexican descent
more often than other ethnic groups.4 In fact a “Mexican appearance” is
the most salient factor considered when deciding who to stop to
investigate illegal border crossings.5
In cases involving racial profiling, government officials use the race
or ethnicity of an individual to suggest criminal activity.6 The practice
singles out an individual not because of his criminal activity, but because
of his race or ethnicity.7 Racial profiling is founded on the premise that
racial or ethnic minorities inherently commit certain crimes.8 For several
reasons, the use of race as the determining factor to identify criminal
qualities is an ineffective tool in law enforcement investigations. It
“perpetuate[s] negative racial stereotypes that are harmful to our rich
and diverse democracy, and materially impair[s] our efforts to maintain
a fair and just society.”9 It not only undermines our constitutional rights,
it undermines the trust on which law enforcement depends to effectively
protect communities.10
Racial profiling by police officers has done more to divide
Americans and perpetuate bigotry than any other form of racism. It
diminishes any progress that has been made by America to achieve
racial equality and fair treatment of all its citizens. Racial profiling
perpetuates a caste system in the American criminal justice system and
is a form of racism that America must abandon if she intends to set an
4
See generally United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Border officers on
roving patrol stopped defendant’s car, saying later their only reason for doing so was the
occupants’ apparent Mexican descent. Id. at 874-75.
5
Id.
6
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 654 (2002). ‘“[R]acial profiling’ occurs
when a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrest, searches, or otherwise investigates
a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group
are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is
investigating.” Id.
7
Gene Callahan & William Anderson, The Roots of Racial Profiling, REASON MAG., Aug.Sept. 2001, at 2 (explaining that when defining racial profiling that “the reason for the stop
is a statistical profile of the detainee’s race or ethnicity”).
8
See Gross & Barnes, supra note 6.
9
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/
documents/guidance_on_race.htm [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE].
10
End Racial Profiling Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3847 Before the Sub. Comm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 249 (2004) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.
of Michigan).
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example of freedom for other nations. However, public and political
attention to this phenomenon has waned. The discussion of racial
profiling is only heard in the context of terrorism and passing
conversations when some act of police brutality occurs. Efforts to
eradicate racial profiling and the racist presumptions that give birth to it
have become dormant. It is important to restart the conversations and
studies of racial profiling to reach solutions to the problem.
A. Failed Efforts To Address Racial Profiling
Both former President William J. Clinton and current President
George W. Bush have condemned the practice of racial profiling and
recognized it as an anathema to effective law enforcement. Former
President Clinton characterized it as “deeply corrosive” and “morally
indefensible.”11 President George W. Bush has said that it is “wrong and
we will end it.”12
After President Bush’s statement in 2001 describing racial profiling
as “wrong,” he signed a White House memorandum requesting that the
Attorney General “review the use by Federal law enforcement
authorities of race as a factor in conducting stops, searches, and other
investigative procedures.”13
In response, Attorney General John
Ashcroft instructed the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice to develop guidance to address the problem of racial profiling.
These efforts resulted in a policy guidance for federal law enforcement
officers.14
However, the federal guidance enacted by the Attorney General’s
office is a vain attempt to address the real problem of racial profiling.
11
Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1999, at A22 (quoting a statement made by President William J. Clinton in a
conference with civil rights leaders and police leaders in his address at the Justice
Department Conference) (internal quotations omitted). President Clinton stated, “While
public confidence in the police has been growing steadily overall, people of color continue
to have less confidence and less trust, and believe they are targeted for action . . . ” Law
Enforcement Practice of Racial Profiling Under Fire (June 9, 1999), http://cnnstudentnews.
cnn.com/US/9906/09/race.police.02/. He called racial profiling a morally indefensible,
deeply corrosive practice and emphasized that “‘[r]acial profiling is in fact the opposite of
good-police work where actions are based on hard facts, not stereotypes . . . . It is wrong, it
is destructive, and it must stop.’” Holmes, supra, at A22.
12
President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress 4 (Feb. 17, 2001),
reprinted in 147 Cong. Rec. H433 (2001), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/02/20010228.html.
13
President George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 27, 2001),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010228-1.html.
14
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9.
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First, it does not carry the force of law. Specifically, the policy guidance
provides standards for federal law enforcement agencies in conducting
investigations which may involve race or ethnicity,15 but it does not
impose any sanctions on an officer who may engage in the prohibited
conduct, nor does it provide a remedy for a citizen who may be the
target of racial profiling.16 Also, the federal guidance policy is a federal
standard and does not restrict states or local law enforcement agencies
where the vast majority of criminal investigations are conducted.17
Further, the definition contained in the federal guidance loosely
defines racial profiling.18 It states that “‘Racial profiling’ . . . concerns the
invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in conducting stops,
searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures.”19 The
policy guidance does not suggest criteria that will help determine when
an officer has engaged in racial profiling of a suspect. It does not
indicate what a complainant must show to prove a case of racial
profiling.20 Thus, the definition proposed by the policy guidance does
not detail how racial profiling is determined; it only says that the
practice is wrong.
Most importantly, the policy guidance does not address what has
become the most pressing issues concerning profiling by ethnicity since
9/11.21 It permits federal law enforcement officials to use ethnicity when
investigating or preventing threats to national security.22 The only limits
placed on the use of ethnicity in these instances are that officials must
meet the standards permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.23 With the enactment of the Patriot Act, what is permitted by law

Id.
Id.
17
See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 2 (4th ed. 2004).
18
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9.
19
Id. at 1.
20
Proving racial profiling has been an almost insurmountable obstacle for victims.
There is no Fourth Amendment remedy for the practice, and under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the victim must show disparate treatment and an intent
to discriminate. This burden has been arduous. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 24143 (1976) (requiring claimants to prove discriminatory intent in order to establish that a
policy, discriminatory in its application, violates the Equal Protection Clause); see also Anne
Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After
United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1072-74 (1997).
21
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9, at 5.
22
Id.
23
Id.
15
16
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is amorphous at best.24 This is most clearly seen by the unilateral act of
spying on Americans that President Bush recently condoned as legal in
times when national security is threatened by terrorists—a decision that
has seemingly increased the gap of mistrust many Americans have for
the Executive Branch.25
In addition to President Bush’s and Attorney General Ashcroft’s
efforts, two bills were introduced in Congress aimed at prohibiting racial
profiling.26 Although the attempts at federal legislation are starts, they
are somewhat inconsistent in their efforts and are incomplete. The
federal bills, introduced in Congress over a year ago, lay dormant
without action by either the House or Senate. The bills were sent to
committee where they remain at the time of this research.27 Such
inaction indicates that legislators do not consider racial profiling to be an
important topic or a drastic enough problem for them to tackle.
If the evils of racial profiling are to be eliminated as a thorn in the
American criminal justice system’s side, the lackadaisical attitude taken
by all three branches of the government must change. The Court must
firmly state that racial profiling is an affront on the freedoms guaranteed
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the
Fourth Amendment.28 Additionally, the legislative branch must enact
laws that will affect state policies on the topic and send a consistent
24
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The USA Patriot Act:
Preserving Life and Liberty,
www.lifeandliberty.gov/highlights.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
25
Bush: ‘No Doubt’ NSA Surveillance Is Legal (Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.prisonplanet.
com/articles/january2006/290106surveillance.htm (President George W. Bush defended
his program of warrantless surveillance saying, “‘There’s no doubt in my mind it is legal.’
. . . [The program] ‘is designed to protect civil liberties,’ and . . . ‘it’s necessary.’”); see also
Dan
Eggen,
Bush
Authorized
Domestic
Spying,
(Dec.
16,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR20051216000
21.html (“It’s clear that the administration has been very willing to sacrifice civil liberties in
its effort to exercise its authority on terrorism, to the extent that it authorizes criminal
activity . . . .”) (quoting Caroline Fredrickson, Director of Washington Legislative Office,
American Civil Liberties Union).
26
S. 2132, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2112, 108th Cong. (2004).
27
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
28
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part “nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The
Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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resounding message condemning racial profiling.
However, to
accomplish this feat, several questions must be honestly assessed. First,
can race ever be a factor in criminal investigations? If race can be a
factor, what role should it play in defining who to stop and investigate?
Moreover, if race can be a factor, what can be done to ensure that it is not
the “determining factor” in criminal investigations?
This research reopens the discussion on racial profiling and suggests
remedies that may help eradicate a problem that cuts at the core of
discrimination in America. Part II of this Article discusses the
backlashes of racial profiling and why it is the anathema that will cause
America to lose credibility in her efforts to democratize other societies.
Further, Part II discusses the importance of taking affirmative action to
eliminate racial profiling from certain police investigations. Part III
addresses criminal investigations and profiling, and how race and
ethnicity have become accepted factors for reasonable suspicion in
certain crimes, while Part IV suggests a judicial remedy that may help
eliminate the most insidious forms of racial profiling from police
investigations.
II. THE ILLS OF RACIAL PROFILING
Cases and studies indicate that racial profiling is most likely to occur
in drug crime investigations, whether they are conducted by state and
local police officers or federal Drug Enforcement Agents, or crimes that
are related to enforcing laws against illegal immigration.29 David Harris
has stated that the “war on drugs” is significantly to blame for the abuse
of police officers powers when making stops.30 “Racial profiling is
based on the premise that most drug offenses are committed by
minorities.”31 Thus, police officers looking for drugs will stop drivers
based on the color of their skin.32 A further analysis of racial profiling

See DEBORAH RAMIREZ, JACK MCDEVITT & AMY FARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A
RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES
AND LESSONS LEARNED 4 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/
184768.pdf [hereinafter RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS]; see also NEW JERSEY
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 20, 1999), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf.
30
HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK, supra note 3, at 2.
31
Id.
32
Id.
29
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suggests that brown skin and Mexican ancestry will alert officers
investigating illegal immigration.33
A. Specific Problems of Racial Profiling
As Randall Kennedy explains it, the practice of racial profiling
requires blacks and Mexican-Americans to pay a type of racial tax for the
war against drugs and illegal immigration that whites and other groups
escape.34 The racial tax penalizes innocent victims of color for the
misconduct of others who also happen to be black or MexicanAmerican.35 Police officers who use the practice of racial profiling to
investigate drug trafficking or illegal immigration stop and search blacks
and Hispanics at a far greater rate than their share of the population, and
also at a far greater rate than their rate of offending.36 The frequency of
these selective stops compared to the number of stops of other racial or
ethnic groups for these type of crimes suggests that the race of
individuals investigated is a predominant consideration in determining
who to stop. Thus, blacks and Hispanics are burdened or taxed
unreasonably in the effort to curtail drug trading, other drug crimes, and
illegal immigration.37

33
See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163,
239-40 (2002). Alschuler references the opinions of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975) and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), stating that the
prevalence of illegal immigration across the Mexican border “had a brown face.” Id.
34
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 161 (1997). One solution that
Kennedy suggests to ending the racial tax is placing a tax across the board on all citizens for
these ills. Id. He states
Instead of placing a racial tax on blacks, Mexican-Americans, and other
colored people, governments should, if necessary, increase taxes across
the board. More specifically, rather than authorizing police to count
apparent Mexican ancestry or apparent blackness as negative proxies,
states and the federal government should be forced either to hire more
officers or to inconvenience everyone at checkpoints by subjecting all
motorists and passengers to questioning (or to the same chance at
random questioning). The reform I support, in other words, does not
entail lessened policing. It only insists that the costs of policing be
allocated on a nonracial basis.
Id.
35
Id. at 160.
36
See Jennifer A. Larrabee, “DWB (Driving While Black)” and Equal Protection: The Realities
of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 291, 296-97 (1997); see also Wesley M.
Oliver, With an Evil Eye and Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial
Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1423-25 (2000).
37
Supra note 34.
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Additionally, racial profiling places a social stigma on the targeted
groups, who are black and brown citizens.38 When police officers
indiscriminately stop people of color to investigate them for certain
crimes, a subliminal message is sent to the entire society suggesting that
people of color are more inclined to engage in unacceptable activity.
Consider Jerry Kang’s statement that “[i]f it bleeds, it leads.”39
Sensationalistic crime stories are disproportionately shown with racial
minorities repeatedly featured as violent criminals.40 Consumption of
these images intensifies our implicit biases against racial minorities, a
form of cognition Kang refers to as “[r]acial schema[ ].”41 Consequently,
black and brown citizens are labeled by the unaffected portion of society
as criminals and they are generally feared.42 White citizens and even
some well-to-do members of the targeted groups will avoid the harassed
citizens and their communities at all costs. Civil rights leader Reverend
Jesse Jackson acknowledged the existence of subconscious stereotyping
against minorities when he publicly recalled his own statement that
“‘There is nothing more painful for me at this stage in my life than to
walk down the street and hear footsteps and start to think about robbery
and then look around and see it’s somebody white and feel relieved.
How humiliating.’”43 This attitude of “avoid that community” stifles the
positive traffic flow of business from the general society into
communities where persons of the targeted groups may live or frequent.
These areas suffer economically and eventually become strongholds of
poverty and crime.
Furthermore, racial profiling can be a source of tension and distrust
between the police and minorities.44 If the criminal justice system is to
meet its goal of crime detection and prevention, it must have the trust of
the communities it serves.45 When law enforcement practices used to
38
David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of
Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 455 (2003)
[hereinafter Harris, Using Race]. “Racial profiling stigmatizes and penalizes, whether
intentionally or not, on the basis of membership in a group.” Id.
39
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2005) (internal
quotations omitted).
40
Id. at 1495.
41
Id. at 1498. Kang defines a schema as a cognitive structure that represents knowledge
about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those
attributes. Id.
42
Id.
43
Nelson Lund, The Conservative Case Against Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism, 66
ALB. L. REV. 329, 333 (2003).
44
See Harris, Using Race, supra note 38, at 3.
45
Id.
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stop and investigate minorities are perceived as biased and unfair,
minority citizens will have less confidence in the criminal justice system,
and thus, will report crimes infrequently, will not be witnesses at trials,
or will not serve as jurors.46
Last, racial profiling creates a sense of disconnect from the general
society for the targeted groups. A police policy that continuously targets
a race or ethnic group for criminal activity indicates to members of the
group that they are pariah.47 They begin to feel that the protections that
are given to other races or ethnic groups will not be extended to them.48
Such a decline in trust leads to a lack of cooperation between police and
the targeted groups, which ultimately results in the reduction of criminal
deterrence.49 The targeted groups begin to sense that they have been
separated from the larger community.50
B. Using Race To Determine Who To Stop
Studies done in New Jersey, Maryland, Texas, and New York have
shown that African-Americans and Latinos are stopped for traffic
violations at a much higher rate than Anglo-Americans.51 A recent Texas
study indicates that not only are African-Americans and Latinos stopped
at higher rates, but that blacks and Latinos are searched at a greater rate
as well.52 These statistics are antithetical to studies which indicate that
African-American and Latinos do not engage in crime at a rate greater
than their percentage of the population.53 This data on stops and
Id.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,
28 (2003). “[W]hen officers employ racial profiling to stop young African American males
walking down the street, the officers insult and degrade the young men and their racial
groups, making them feel less than full members of the American polity.” Id.
48
Id.
49
R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling: Race, Policing and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571,
573 (2003); see also RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS, supra note 29.
50
This sensation of contemporary segregation and its detrimental effects are
synonymous to those of the petitioners in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1952). In Brown, the Supreme Court held that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
51
See Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial Profiling in
Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2005); see also STEWARD, RACIAL
PROFILING, supra note 3; Gross & Barnes, supra note 6, at 660; Larrabee, supra note 36; Floyd
Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of
Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 746 (2004).
52
See STEWARD, RACIAL PROFILING, supra note 3.
53
See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling
at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 105, 123 (2003). The growing data
on racial profiling demonstrates that “the hit rate for drugs and weapons in police searches
46
47
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investigations of blacks and Latinos suggests that police officers are not
color blind and that race or ethnicity is a factor used in determining who
to stop and search.
The above being said, society expects law enforcement officers to
take proactive steps to ensure that citizens are safe from crimes against
person and property. The ideal state of law enforcement would be “one
in which most crimes are deterred, and those which are not are
intercepted before an innocent person has been harmed by a criminal.”54
In an ordinary criminal investigation, absent a crime being committed in
the presence of the officer or an identification of a known suspect, an
officer’s belief that something is criminally awry is generally based on a
profile.55 To this end, police officers will use variables such as “sex,
manner of dress, age group, criminal history, marital status, level of
education, location, and time of day” to assess criminal activity.56 In
these instances, police departments collect data about criminal activity to
help them predict who is most likely to engage in certain crimes and
where future criminal activity may occur.57 Profiling in this context “can
be defined as a broad method of targeting police resources based on
where they are most likely to encounter crime.”58 The collected data is
designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of police work by
directing department resources into areas where the goals of crime
prevention and detection can be better achieved.59
For example, a certain neighborhood has experienced a series of
daytime burglaries on Sunday mornings or a particular area of town is
known to be frequented by suspected drug dealers. The police
department may increase officers’ presence in these areas at certain
hours to combat the prevailing trend of crime. This method of profiling,
known as geographical “crime-mapping,” speculates about the future
based on past facts and it places officers in areas where it is perceived

of African Americans is the same as or lower than the rate for whites.” Id. (emphasis
omitted); see also William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating
Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004).
54
Brandon del Pozo, Guided by Race: An Ethical and Policy Analysis of Racial Profiling in
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 1 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 266, 272 (2001).
55
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 986-87 (1999).
56
del Pozo, supra note 54, at 276.
57
Id. at 272.
58
Id. at 275.
59
Id. at 272.
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that certain crimes will occur.60 The purpose is to deter crime before it
happens or detect the crime before damage is done in the community.
Considering the above methods of profiling, can race be a factor in
the equation used to determine who to stop and investigate or does the
use of race violate constitutional protections? Should race be considered
in developing police policy to determine who will be targeted for certain
criminal violations? If race is a permissible factor, what amount of
weight should it be given? Will it become the predominant factor? Will
the use of race distort criminal investigations? These questions will
guide the discussion in the remainder of this research.
III. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, POLICE POLICY, AND RACIAL PROFILING
A primary goal of American criminal law is to define what behavior
is morally unacceptable and to punish those who engage in such
behavior.61 Criminal statutes are enacted to help accomplish these
purposes.62 Law enforcement agencies, in their efforts to protect citizens
from crimes and arrest those who commit crimes, develop policies
designed to detect, prevent, and reduce criminal activity.63 Effective and
constitutional police policies will not infringe on the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the people, but they must be developed and applied in
a manner that will accomplish their stated goals.64 For example, a policy
that allowed for searches of citizens’ homes on a policeman’s hunch that
criminal activity is afoot would result in a loss of confidence in the
criminal justice system that would outweigh any benefit of crime
prevention, detection, or reduction.65
Brandon del Pozo suggests three facets of a test to determine
whether police policies are effective. “The first task would be to ensure
that the policy is a moral end, and if it is not, that it does not interfere
with what are ostensibly moral ends.”66 This indicates that police
departments should carefully consider and prioritize the moral ends that
their policies are constructed to achieve. For example, crimes against
persons would be given more attention than crimes against property.67
Id. at 276.
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 50 (1997); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW 9-11 (4th ed. 2003).
62
LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 11.
63
del Pozo, supra note 54, at 272.
64
Id. at 274.
65
Id. at 272.
66
Id. at 273.
67
Id.
60
61
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The second facet of the test is that “[t]he policy must try to meet its
stated goal without violating the moral rights and freedoms of citizens in
its practice.”68 This requirement involves determining when it is
acceptable to curtail moral rights or freedoms to achieve a policy end.
The third requirement is that “[t]he policy must not in and of itself take
on an added negative moral significance by neglecting certain other
moral duties.”69 For example, a community might be experiencing a
high number of shoplifting thefts. However, a police policy directing all
of the department’s resources to this problem and neglecting more
serious crimes of robbery and murder is both negligent and illogical.
Considering del Pozo’s factors in light of racial profiling, a police
policy that singles out an individual for criminal investigation solely
because he is of a particular race or ethnic group would be immoral
within itself, and it cannot be the means to any legitimate moral end.70
Such a policy blatantly offends the moral rights and freedoms of equal
protection of the law, and the negative effect of alienating the targeted
group thwarts the primary purpose of pre-arrest criminal investigation.71
However, a police policy that completely prohibits the use of race as a
factor in certain limited criminal investigations may ignore sound law
enforcement techniques that can help reduce crime.72 As a result, in
limited situations, race has been accepted as a legitimate factor that
officers may use when conducting certain criminal investigations.73
A. Is Race a Factor that Police Officers Use When Deciding Who To Stop?
It is an accepted axiom that race alone cannot initiate a police
officer’s decision to stop and investigate an individual. However, when
Id. at 274.
Id.
70
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, provides for equal protection of the law for all citizens.
71
YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 4 (11th ed. 2005). The commentators explain that in
pre-arrest investigations notes that there are three basic groups of pre-arrest investigative
procedures: “(1) police procedures that are aimed at solving specific past crimes known to
the police . . . ; (2) police procedures that are aimed at unknown but anticipated ongoing
and future criminal activity . . . ; and (3) prosecutorial and other non-police investigations
conducted primarily through the use of subpoena authority.” Id.
72
Sean P. Trende, Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combating Racial
Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 361 (2000). Trende states that “it seems that racial profiling is, to
a certain extent, a rational reaction to the current realities of society, and that eliminating it
would exact a toll upon society by removing a somewhat-effective crime-fighting
technique.” Id.
73
See United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1985). Race may be
considered as one of the factors contributing to a founded suspicion of criminal conduct,
although race alone cannot justify an investigatory stop. Id.
68
69
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looking for criminal traits, police officers look for traits which they
believe correlate with criminal behavior.74 More often than not, the
officer associates criminal or deviant behavior with conduct—a
mannerism, language, or an appearance—that differs from his.75 The
race or ethnicity of the suspect is the first factor that a police officer
notices. It becomes a relevant factor in suggesting criminal behavior
when the officer considers what is different about the suspect.76
However, officers suggest that factors other than race or ethnicity
actually alert their attention to an alleged suspect.77
In United States v. Taylor,78 the arresting officers suggested that they
noticed the suspect because of the suspect’s “obviously agitated conduct
and appearance.”79 In United States v. Avery, officers noticed a young
African-American walking hurriedly, and subsequently stated that they
suspected the defendant because of his demeanor. In both cases, the
suspect was an African-American. 80
These cases suggest that after racially identifying an individual, an
officer begins to look for other characteristics that may give him
reasonable suspicion to stop the person for an investigation.81 If asked,
the officer justifies his initial stop of the suspect by referring to other
acceptable factors, such as agitated conduct, hurried demeanor, or
unusual appearance, and leaving race out of the equation.82

Thompson, supra note 55, at 986.
Id. at 987. Thompson suggests that police officers bring to their trade preconceived
ideas about people and what are criminal traits. Id. These perceptions are often reduced to
culturally embedded stories about groups. Id. One misnomer that officers apply is that
people of color are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than whites. Id. As a result,
discriminatory treatment is often a product of unconscious racism. Id.
76
Id.
77
See United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992). The court found that the
initial encounter and search of the suspect was consensual. Id. The arresting officers stated
that the suspect was poorly attired, but carried a new bag; he ran rapidly along the
corridor, furtively scanning the course of his travel, and proceeded directly to the curb
without claiming any baggage. Id. Even though the suspect was the only AfricanAmerican on the plane, the officers deny that he was singled out because of his race. Id. In
United States v. Avery, officers noticed a young African-American walking hurriedly, and
suggested that reasonable suspicion was based on the suspect’s demeanor and not his race.
128 F.3d 974, 976-77 (6th Cir. 1997).
78
956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992).
79
Id. at 574.
80
Avery, 128 F.3d at 976-77.
81
Id.
82
See id.; Taylor, 956 F.2d 572. But see United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113-14 (6th
Cir. 1994). In Harvey, an officer in court stated that “if the occupants had not been AfricanAmericans, he would not have stopped the car.” Id.
74
75
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If the race of the individual had never caught the officer’s attention,
the purported suspect may very well have gone unnoticed.83 Randall
Kennedy suggests that whenever race is a factor in determining who to
stop and investigate, police officers cannot divest their perceptions about
the crime and the race of the individual, and thus race becomes the
primary factor in making the stop.84 Hence, in the police officer’s initial
observation of criminal conduct, the suspect’s race may be more than
just a factor; it may become the decisive factor in determining whether to
make the stop and investigate the individual.85
This can be seen in a case where an individual may be “out of
place,” that is, in an area where the officer does not expect to encounter
people of the suspect’s race,86 or the individual may be in an area where
people of the suspect’s race are believed by the officer to engage in
certain criminal activity.87 Assume that three young Mexican-American
males are riding in an older model Oldsmobile in a mostly white upscale
community or that a “preppie” young white male is in an all black
neighborhood where several drug arrests have been made. These
seemingly innocuous observations will peak the officer’s interest in the
individual and incite him to investigate.88 Supposedly, the race of the
suspect is not the primary consideration. However, the individual’s race
is the pivotal factor that alerts the officer. Subconsciously, the officer
equates the race of the individual together with his peculiar location to
mean that criminal wrongdoing is afoot.89 Based on inaccurate

83
See United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oakes stated, “One has the uncomfortable
impression here that, but for the Hispanic appearance of Flores and Vasquez, they might
not have been stopped.” Id.
84
See KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 148-49; see also Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1999, available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/
v99.n656.a02.html (noting that “in crime fighting, race matters”). “When asked, most cops
will declare themselves color blind. But watch them on the job for several months, and get
them talking about the way policing is really done, and the truth will emerge, the truth
being that cops, white and black, profile.” Id.
85
KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 148-49.
86
See State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Wash. 1992) (“racial incongruity, i.e., a person
of any race being allegedly ‘out of place’ in a particular geographic area” could not be
considered in the reasonable suspicion inquiry).
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992).
89
See Thompson, supra note 55, at 987.
Given the nature of law enforcement, stereotyping would appear
integral to the police officer’s world. Not only are police officers
trained to enforce the laws and norms of our society, they are
encouraged to investigate behavior that appears to them to be out of
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perceptions of individuals of the suspect’s race group, the officer
pursues a racially motivated hunch in an attempt to develop reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to seize the individual.90
In the above hypothetical case, race became a predominant factor in
the criminal investigation. It distorted the officer’s view of possible
suspects, and he equated criminality to a race of people, rather than to
an identified, accepted criminal profile. The race of the suspect was
misused by the officer to suggest that people of the suspect’s racial
group are inclined to commit crimes. In other words, the use of race or
ethnicity in most cases
permits a state actor to inject racist attitudes into the
carrying out of what should be color-blind law
enforcement. . . . The use of an immutable characteristic
as the basis of suspicion for criminal activity is patently
unconstitutional, and the notion that DEA agents and
like state personnel can consider race in carrying out its
duties is nothing short of outrageous and cannot be
permitted.91
B. If Race Can Be a Factor, How Should It Be Used?
Because race is oftentimes misused by police officers, it is important
to develop a solution that will ensure that when the use of a suspect’s
race or ethnicity is permissible, an officer will not use an individual’s
race or ethnicity to suggest criminal activity. It is unconscionable to
suggest that innocent persons of a racial or ethnic group must suffer
constitutional infringements because of unfounded perceptions that an
officer may have about the group. However, a proper solution for racial
profiling cannot totally remove race as a permissible factor in all
criminal investigations. Outlawing the use of race in every instance
would not necessarily change police behavior on the street.92

the ordinary. . . The resulting mindset makes it more likely that
officers will associate difference with deviance.
Id.
Id. In the case concerning the preppie white youth, it is the neighborhood and its
occupants that are suspect. Id. The officer stereotypes the neighborhood based on the race
of its occupants and surmises that the white youth is associated with the neighborhood
only because of the criminal nature of the residents. Id.
91
United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 582 (6th Cir. 1992).
92
See generally Thompson, supra note 55.
90
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Further, a wholesale removal of race from all criminal investigations
may prevent police departments from effectively meeting appropriate
objectives and carrying out proper departmental policies.93 Thus, any
solution to eradicate racial profiling must ensure that there is a proper
balance between the constitutional safeguard of equal protection and
police policies that use race appropriately. If race is permitted to be a
factor, there should be clear guidelines concerning its use. Accordingly,
it is necessary to first define those situations where race may be used in
ordinary criminal investigations.
C. Permissible Uses of Race in Criminal Investigations
Race has been accepted as a factor in ordinary criminal
investigations in at least three obvious situations: when a description of
the suspect includes his race, when there is information about a certain
crime spree that involves persons of a particular race or ethnic group,
and when an investigation of criminal activity focuses on a one-race
community.94 The United States Supreme Court has also validated the
use of race or ethnicity in cases involving illegal drug trafficking and the
entrance of illegal aliens.95
1.

Race as a Part of the Suspect’s Description

One legitimate use of race in ordinary pre-arrest criminal
investigations involves an officer’s response to a complaint that provides
information about the suspect’s physical characteristics, including his
race. In United States v. Travis,96 the Sixth Circuit concluded that “race or
ethnic background may become a legitimate consideration when
investigators have information on this subject about a particular suspect.
If, for example, officers know that a bank robber was white, the officers
may limit their investigation to whites.”97 The officer’s investigation in
this instance consists of no more than stopping a group of people who
match the given description to see if any person in that group can be
identified as the person in question. However, the use of race as a factor
in this situation should be narrowly tailored to meet the government’s
interest in apprehending criminals.98 This suggests that officers should
See KENNEDY, supra note 34 (suggesting that race should be barred totally in
determining suspicion in criminal investigations). Kennedy believes the use of race should
be illegal.
94
These situations are explained more fully in infra Parts III.C.1-III.C.3.
95
See infra Parts III.C.4-III.C.6 for details.
96
62 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. 1995).
97
Id. at 174.
98
See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184-85.
93
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conduct their search for a person that matches the physical description in
the general vicinity of the crime or in areas where evidence obtained
from the crime may lead them.99 A search that is too broad—that is, a
search that questions every person of the racial group, even those who
are removed from the crime scene—abridges the Equal Protection
Clause.100
An example of a questionable use of race to identify a suspect is seen
in Brown v. City of Oneonta.101 In Oneonta, a 77-year-old woman was
attacked near Oneonta, New York.102 The victim reported to the New
York State Police that her assailant was a young black male and that he
had cut his hand with his knife during the attack.103 A police canine unit
tracked the assailant’s scent from the scene of the crime toward the
nearby campus of the State University of New York College at Oneonta
(“SUCO”).104 Only two percent of SUCO’s students were black. Based
on this information, the police contacted SUCO and obtained a list of all
black male students enrolled at the school.105 When this effort produced
no suspects, the police conducted a sweep of Oneonta. They questioned
nonwhite persons on the streets and inspected their hands for cuts.106
In a civil suit brought by several people who were questioned, the
court found that police action did not deprive the plaintiffs of their right
to equal protection under the law.107 It stated that the plaintiffs had not
been questioned solely on the basis of their race.108 They were
questioned on the altogether legitimate basis of a physical description
given by the victim of a crime, and the police department’s policy was
race neutral.109 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently
allege that the police policies had a discriminatory intent.110
But in Oneonta, the search conducted by the New York State Police
was not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s crime-fighting
goal.111 Remember, a police policy must try to meet its stated goal
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 199.
Id.
221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 337.
Id.
See id. at 337-38.
See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184.
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without violating the moral rights and freedoms of citizens in its
practice.112 The broad sweep of the city which was based on a
description that consisted of race, approximate age, and gender alone
singled black males out of the population for investigation. A police
policy that permits officers to question all persons of a particular race on
a broad spectrum with such a minute description fosters a practice that
offends the privacy freedoms of the targeted race.
The Oneonta court’s suggestion that the impact of the investigation
was reasonable, in light of the government’s interest because the number
of black males in the city was negligible, is incredible.113 Let us assume
that the suspect was a white male and the city’s racial composition was
overwhelmingly black. It is unthinkable that the police would conduct
an investigation that would result in questioning practically every white
male in the city for a crime that involved nominal injury to person or
property. This method of investigating the crime would be less likely to
produce a suspect than it would to raise the ire of the public, especially
those in the targeted group.114
The theory of incompetently targeting one race of people was
poignantly displayed in the case of serial killer Derrick Todd Lee in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.115 For months a criminal profile pointed to a
white man. However, once the profile was broadened, Lee, a black man,
was arrested within the same week. The one fact that ultimately
dumbfounded people was that the final suspect was black, and serial
killers “aren’t supposed to be black.”116 Inserting race clouds our
judgment about who conducts certain crimes and lulls us into a false
sense of security.117
The identity of a suspect may be the most important variable that
will assist officers in apprehending a criminal offender. However, this
See Oneonta, 392 F.3d at 338-39.
Id. at 334, 338. The city of Oneonta has a population of just over 17,500 residents with
an African-American student population of approximately 2%. Id. at 338.
114
State v. Lee, 879 So. 2d 173, 173 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
115
Id.
116
Issac Bailey, Race Can Hinder an Investigation, THE SUN NEWS (Myrtle Beach, S.C.), June
9, 2003.
117
Id. Bailey states that racial profiling is
like a proverbial woman who walks down the sidewalk late at night
and spots an approaching black male and promptly darts across the
street for safety. She’d better be sure her fear is based on something
other than race because she could be leaving the side of the street with
Martin Luther King, Jr. and running into the arms of Tedd Bundy.
Id.
112
113
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goal is better served by structuring the search in a manner that is more
likely to target the officer’s resources on potential suspects rather than an
entire community. The government’s goal in Oneonta would have been
served by questioning black men who may have been seen in the area at
the time of the crime, questioning black male students at SUCO on the
evening of the crime, as the police dogs led the officers to the campus, or
questioning black males in the city who may have recently committed a
similar crime.118 An investigation based on the identification of a
suspect by race conducted in this manner would have been more
productive and less volatile.
The methods that the government uses to apprehend a criminal
should also consider the gravity of the offense committed. This variable
is important when weighing the government’s interest—criminal
apprehension—against the infringement on the targeted citizen’s privacy
interests. The impact or severity of the crime will help determine the
significance of the governmental interest and how the methods used to
accomplish this interest should be tailored.119 In Oneonta, there was no
death, violent injury, threat to a community of people, or significant loss
of property. Instead, the crime of interest in Oneonta was a burglary
which ended in a brief struggle with the homeowner. There was no
report of a series of such crimes. Thus, the sweep of the entire city was
unreasonable considering the gravity of the offense committed. The
governmental interest in apprehending a burglar did not outweigh the
enormous burden placed on the African-American men who were
subjected to the government’s intrusion.120 A properly structured police
118
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9. In explaining methods
that should be used by law enforcement officers conducting specific criminal investigations
the guidance policy states:
[The] [r]eliance upon generalized stereotypes is absolutely forbidden.
Rather, use of race or ethnicity is permitted only when the officer is
pursuing a specific lead concerning the identifying characteristics of
persons involved in an identified criminal activity. The rationale
underlying this concept carefully limits its reach. In order to qualify as
a legitimate investigative lead, the following must be true: [(1)] The
information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the
criminal activity; [(2)] The information must be trustworthy; [and (3)]
The information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied to a
particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a particular
criminal organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
119
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
120
See id. “Apprehension . . . is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable
requirement. To determine whether such a seizure is reasonable, the extent of the intrusion
on the suspect’s rights under that Amendment must be balanced against the governmental
interests in effective law enforcement.” Id.
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policy cannot take on an added negative moral significance.121 Focusing
a large amount of resources on this crime may force the police
department to remove officers from areas where there is a greater need.
2.

Race as a Factor When There Is Information About a Crime Spree

Race is also an important factor in criminal investigations when
police officers have credible information that persons from a certain
racial group have been involved in a particular crime spree.122 For
instance, assume police are aware that members of a street gang are
bringing large quantities of drugs into their city from a certain source
city. If the members of the street gang are of a particular race, police
officers will stop young men of the identified race who demonstrate
characteristics of the gang and other criminal behavior related to the
suspected crime.123 Such a stop is based on a police policy designed to
prevent drug traffic in the city and may include surveying or watching
young men who have characteristics that are unique to an identified
suspected group. That is, the police may look for young men who wear
a certain color bandana, who are of a certain race, and who are arriving
from a known source city.124 The above factors are considered in the
totality of the circumstances. Additionally, other factors that suggest
criminal behavior should be considered before stopping a person of the
targeted group.125
The suspect’s race in this situation is a primary factor in deciding
who to stop. Is this racial profiling? The practice does not suggest that a
group of people is more inclined to commit certain crimes because of the
race of its members. The stops are focused and based on variables that
are meant to prevent drug trafficking. Race is not the sole factor used to
make the stops. Rather, the characteristics of members of the gang, the
arrival point into the city, and the suspects’ reactions and mannerisms
are all considered before engaging the person. Further, the credible
121
Id. The Tennessee statute authorized use of deadly force against unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect. The Court said, “There is no indication that holding a police
practice such as that authorized by the statute unreasonable will severely hamper effective
law enforcement.” Id.; see also del Pozo, supra note 54, at 273.
122
Sharon Davies, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System After September 11, 2001, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 72-73 (2003); see also Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling
Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1433-34 (2002).
123
Characteristics of the gang may include dress, identifiable tattoos, etc. Characteristics
of the crime may be part of a criminal profile.
124
See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 172-73 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 1997). A suspect’s race, in combination with additional
circumstances and evidence, could constitute reasonable suspicion. Id.
125
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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information received by the department together with the current drug
problem necessitates an investigation that is narrowly tailored to meet
the governmental end.126
3.

Race as a Factor When Investigating Crime in a One-race
Community

Assume that a police department decides to place more officers in a
predominantly black neighborhood because the residents of the
community have complained about an increase in drug activity. Officers
assigned to patrol the neighborhood aggressively pursue young black
males who they believe are involved in drug activity. All of the stops for
drug investigations in the neighborhood are of young black males.
Police officers making the stops suggest that the stops are based on the
officers’ experiences when dealing with drugs in a black
neighborhood.127 The officers indicate that they consider factors such as
age, appearance, vehicle driven, actions of the suspects, time of day, and
where the persons of interest are located.128 But the citizens in the
neighborhood suggest that the officers are engaging in profiling young
black men. Are the stops based on the race of the suspects or a police
policy to reduce drug activity?
“As long as a department’s goals are moral and properly ordered,
and barring . . . negligence, policies may be enacted, repealed or changed
to meet the sensibilities and expectations of the citizens they serve.”129
However, citizen dismay or disapproval of a police policy should not
result in the changing of a policy to one that will not meet governmental
goals and that will neglect other moral ends.130 A moral end of the
See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184.
See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK,
24-26 (2002) (explaining Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), by stating that the case permitted
officers to take preemptive steps to investigate crime where they had reasonable suspicion
founded upon the officers observations and reasonable inferences a well-trained and
experienced officer could make from those inferences).
128
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the
balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal
security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police
interference. . . When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the
risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.
Id.; see also City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
officers could not stop an individual solely on the basis that he was a stranger in an area
known for crime; the stop must be based on grounds sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion).
129
See del Pozo, supra note 54, at 273.
130
Id.
126
127
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policy in the above hypothetical situation is to reduce drug crimes in a
neighborhood where such crimes have caused concern. To achieve this
end, the police department increased its presence in the affected
neighborhood. As long as the police policy of increasing their presence
in the black neighborhood and aggressively pursuing suspects who
match the characteristics and demeanor of those who may engage in
drug crimes is aligned with the goal of crime reduction, the policy does
not offend constitutional rights or privileges.
However, the tactics that police officers use to address the drug
problem must be properly designed to meet the stated goal of crime
reduction.131 The tactics used may be based on police officers’
experiences in dealing with drugs in the targeted neighborhood and
reasonable suspicion gained during their surveillance of possible drug
suspects.132 They cannot be unreasonable or overly aggressive in their
pursuits.133
Race in the above instance is a factor because of a compelling
governmental goal in reducing crime by reducing drug traffic in a
targeted neighborhood. When conducting their investigations, officers
will use their experience to determine the tactics to be used when
responding to crimes.134 Their experiences in a particular neighborhood
will also help officers draw their own conclusions about the use of race
and other variables as factors of potential criminality.135 The individuals
stopped in the hypothetical situation were not stopped solely because of
their race, but rather because of a combination of characteristics which
led the officers to believe that they were involved in drug trafficking.
Though race was a factor in the stops, it was not used in a manner that
suggests officers were targeting a particular racial group because of a
belief that they are more inclined to engage in criminal activity; it is only
a factor because of the report of increased drug activity in a one-race
neighborhood. As a result, unless it can be shown that the manner of
carrying out the policy contained a discriminatory intent, the use of race

131
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). “[T]he permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id.
132
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
133
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
134
See Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
135
See Goldberg, supra note 84. An interview with an officer reveals that he uses his
intuition and experiences gained from his tenure as a highway patrol when determining
who may be a criminal suspect. Id.
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Thus, there is no violation of the Equal

The use of race as a factor in cases where an identity is given of the
suspect which involves his race, where there is a crime spree which
involves individuals of a certain race or ethnicity, or where crimes are
investigated in one-race neighborhoods seems to meet an appropriate
police policy that does not offend constitutional protections. Race in
these instances is not used to single-out or insidiously label particular
groups of individuals as criminals because of their race. In each of the
situations a complaint is made or facts are known that give details about
the race of the suspect. When race is used in this perspective in
conjunction with other variables, it can assist police departments with
detecting and preventing criminal activities. In particular, race permits
the investigating officers to narrow their search to individuals who are
more likely involved in the suspected criminal activity.137 This focused
search can hasten the investigation and possibly prevent other criminal
acts by the suspect. Here, the inclusion of race as one factor used to
conduct the criminal investigation is the most sensible and logical means
to pursue the complained of criminal. The profile information used in
these examples is the same that would be used by officers in other
criminal investigations regardless of the race of the suspect.138
As suggested by Randall Kennedy, “The law should authorize police
to engage in racially discriminatory investigative conduct only on
atypical, indeed extraordinary, occasions in which the social need is
absolutely compelling: weighty, immediate, and incapable of being
addressed sensibly by any other means.”139 Race should be used in
ordinary criminal investigations only when it is imperative to meet a
non-discriminatory goal of the crime prevention or detection. In the
above situations, the race of the individuals was used only to help police
meet a proper policy goal and it was not as a proxy for criminal activity.

See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 (1996).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9 (explaining police
investigation of a suspected individual).
138
See RICHARD G. SCHOTT, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, THE ROLE OF RACE IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT: RACIAL PROFILING OR LEGITIMATE USE?
(Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/november2001/nov01p24.htm.
139
See KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 161.
136
137
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Profiling in Drug Enforcement Agency Drug Investigations Has
Been Permitted

Besides permitting the use of race in instances where it is important
to ordinary criminal investigations, courts have recognized that the race
or ethnicity of a suspect may provide valuable information in drug
interdiction cases when combined with other known or observed
characteristics of individuals who may commit such crimes.140 Police
officers are entitled to assess the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the subject of their attention in light of their experience and
training.141 In doing so, the officer will look for variables that will
suggest to him that criminal activity is afoot.142 These variables may
include the dress of the suspect, where he is located, how he responds to
the officer’s initial inquiries, excessive nervousness, or attempts to avoid
the officer.143 The list goes on and on.
Generally, when investigating drug crimes at international
checkpoints, police officers use drug profiles to identify possible
suspects.144 In United States v. Berry,145 the court listed several basic
characteristics that make up a drug courier profile.
The seven primary characteristics [listed by the court in
Berry] are:
(1) arrival from or departure to an identified source
city;
(2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities
of empty suitcases;
(3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid turnaround
time for a very lengthy airplane trip;
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
See SCHOTT, supra note 138.
142
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
143
See Brian Wilson, The War on Drugs: Evening the Odds Through Use of the Airport Drug
Courier Profile, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 207 (1996).
144
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 491 (1983). Royer was observed at Miami
International Airport by two plain-clothes detectives of the Dade County, Florida, Public
Safety Department. Id. The detectives believed that Royer’s appearance, mannerisms,
luggage, and actions fit the so-called “drug courier profile.” Id. The officers placed Royer
in a small room, took his identification and ticket, and retrieved his luggage from the
baggage area. Id. The Court found that Royer had essentially been arrested by the officers
and that his appearance and conduct in general were not adequate grounds for probable
cause. Id. But, the Court surmised that the facts in the case were enough for suspecting
Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they
attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of
an investigative detention. Id.
145
670 F.2d 583, 599 (5th Cir. 1982).
140
141
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(4) use of an alias;
(5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency in
the many thousand of dollars, usually on their
person, in briefcases or bags;
(6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of
small denomination currency; and
(7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily
exhibited by passengers.
The secondary characteristics are[:]
(1) the
almost
exclusive
use
of
public
transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing
from the airport;
(2) immediately making a telephone call after
deplaning;
(3) leaving a false or fictitious call-back telephone
number with the airline being utilized; and
(4) excessively frequent travel to source or
distribution cities.146
The court noted that using a profile is nothing more than an
administrative tool of the police and that the presence or absence of a
particular characteristic on a profile is of no legal significance in the
determination of reasonable suspicion.147 It is the totality of the
circumstances that will dictate whether the officer can stop the suspect
and investigate further.
In United States v. Sokolow,148 the Supreme Court approved the Drug
Enforcement Agency’s use of profiles in drug courier cases. The Court
stated, “A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable
suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that
conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a ‘profile’
does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by
a trained agent.”149 It is the profile together with the articulable factors
that prompts a stop of the suspect and not the profile alone.
Although race or ethnicity is not listed as a part of the drug courier
profile, it has become a part of the totality of the circumstances used by
officers to help them identify who to stop for questioning about possible
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id. at 600.
490 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 11.
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drug activity.150 Considering a suspect’s race in drug investigations is
permitted if the officer can articulate factors that, when cumulated,
would give him reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect is
engaged in the prohibited activity.151 However, race or ethnicity alone
will not establish reasonable suspicion for a stop.152 In sum, courts have
not found that the use of race as a variable in drug interdiction cases
offends recognized constitutional protections as long as the officer’s
encounter with an individual is not based solely on the suspect’s race.153
5.

Using Race in Border Patrol Cases

Similarly, the use of race or ethnicity in a profile is seen in border
patrol cases. In Nicacio v. INS,154 a Chief Patrol Agent for the
Immigration and Nationalization Service testified that, in making
roving-patrol stops, his subordinates considered, in addition to Latino
ethnicity, a “dirty, unkempt appearance,” a “lean and hungry look,” and
“wearing work clothes.”155 Profiles were used by the officers in a similar
manner as those used in drug interdiction cases. The factors stated in
the profile seemingly apply as much to innocent travelers as they do to
an individual smuggling people illegally into the United States; but in
fact, the factors suggest ethnic profiling. Nonetheless, the Court in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte found that the factors sufficed as
alternatives for the stop and neither race nor ethnicity was considered
alone.156

Sheri Lyn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 234
(1983). Most officers would state that race is not a factor in determining who to stop. Id.
151
See United States v. Avery, 821 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1987).
152
Id.
153
See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 173-74 (6th Cir. 1995). Travis complained that
she was targeted by the officers because of her race. Id. The court held that officers may
stop an individual for several reasons, one of which may be race. Id. There is no
Fourteenth Amendment violation as long as some of these reasons are legitimate and can
equal to reasonable suspicion. Id. In United States v. Weaver, the court concluded that
Hicks [the investigating officer] had knowledge, based upon his own
experience and upon the intelligence reports he had received from the
Los Angeles authorities, that young male members of black Los
Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine. To
that extent, then, race, when coupled with the other factors Hicks relied
upon, was a factor in the decision to approach and ultimately detain
Weaver.
966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992). The court found that the suspect’s race along with the
other factors were enough to give Officer Hicks reasonable suspicion to stop Weaver. Id.
154
768 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1985).
155
Id. at 1137.
156
428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
150
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Specifically, the Court emphasized that ethnicity is an important
consideration in border patrol cases. Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell asserted that “even if it be assumed that such referrals [for stops]
are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive
no constitutional violation.”157 That the Border Patrol relies on apparent
Mexican ancestry at the checkpoint is clearly relevant to the needs of law
enforcement.158 Although Latino ethnicity could not itself create the
reasonable suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop, the likelihood
that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough in
an area near the Mexican-United States border to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor.159
6.

The Problems Race and Ethnicity Present in Drug Interdiction and
Border Patrol Cases

In drug interdiction and border patrol cases, the use of race or
ethnicity to help officers identify who to investigate presents special
concerns. On its face, in drug trafficking or interdiction cases, the data
that makes up the drug profile is race neutral.160 Purchasing airline
tickets with large amounts of cash, a rapid turnaround time for a very
lengthy airplane trip, or carrying large amounts of currency in briefcases
or bags are activities that are not unique to any race or ethnic group.161
However, statistics indicate that most individuals stopped for drugs at
airports or other points of entry are racial or ethnic minorities.162 This
157
158
159

Id.
Id.
See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).
Even if they saw enough to think that the occupants were of Mexican
descent, this factor alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that
they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other
aliens who were illegally in the country. . . The likelihood that any
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not
justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 144 (characteristics that make up a drug profile).
See supra text accompanying note 144 (characteristics that make up a drug profile).
162
See United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (Keith, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Judge Damon J. Keith writes,
The disproportionate number of African-Americans who are stopped
indicates that a racial imbalance against African-Americans does exist
and is implicitly sanctioned by the law enforcement agency. The
assumption that seventy-five percent of those persons transporting
drugs and other contraband through public modes of transportation
are African-American is impermissible.
Id.
160
161
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phenomenon suggests that race or ethnicity is an extremely important
factor in determining who to stop and investigate. In border patrol
cases, the Court has not sought to mask the permissive use of ethnicity
as a factor to suggest reasonable suspicion.163 It has only tongue-incheek suggested that the ethnicity of the suspect cannot be the only
factor that initiates the stop.164
It appears that courts have permitted the use of race in drug
interdiction cases on the hypothesis that experienced officers can
distinguish a drug courier, and the essential need to curtail drug
trafficking should yield to that experience. Hence, if the race of the
suspect is a variable that the officer uses in making his assessment, then
we must suffer it to be. The same rationale applies to preventing the
entry of illegal immigrants into the United States. The Court has
justified the use of ethnicity in border patrol cases by finding that the
class of violators is composed of persons who are likely to appear to be
of Mexican descent, and thus, ethnicity is a relevant factor.165 The result
is that the Court is willing to give officers wide discretion in protecting
the borders from illegal immigration.
By giving officers such broad latitude of discretion in drug
interdiction and border patrol cases, courts have given officers de jure
authority to offend the principles of equal protection and those
principles contained in the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.166 Racial and ethnic minorities are
See United States v. Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873.
Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873.
165
Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873.
166
See supra note 28 (providing the text of the Fourth Amendment); see also Ann Mulligan,
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: The Constitutionality of Drug Interdiction Checkpoints, 93 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 227, 227-28 (2002) (discussing the Court’s efforts to protect
individual liberties in roadblock cases). Mulligan states
Had the Court followed the principles it set forth in earlier roadblock
cases, it would have been forced to uphold the drug interdiction
checkpoints as constitutional. Instead, the majority of the Court
created an arbitrary distinction that has no basis in prior case law or in
the wording of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, current roadblock
case law has become confusing and illogical—the Court solved nothing
and despite its attempt to preserve individual liberties under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court failed. States can easily circumvent the
Court’s decision and establish roadblocks identical to the roadblocks
struck down in Edmond simply by taking care to articulate a primary
purpose that the Court has deemed acceptable. As a result, the Court’s
promise to protect Fourth Amendment rights is hollow and illusory.
Increased litigation and uncertainty about the types of roadblocks that
are constitutional will likely result.
163
164
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asked to pay a high cost in the effort to eliminate these crimes.167 They
are singled-out not because of criminal activity, but because of their race
or ethnicity. However, some suggest that race is only a small part of the
equation used to support reasonable suspicion for the stops.168 Other
factors exist that may very well have been enough for the officer to
conduct the investigation and stop the individual.169
It is obvious that race has permeated criminal investigations. Some
uses of race as described above appear to be legitimate; however, others
are insidious. It is these insidious uses of race that have caused the ills
perpetuated by racial profiling discussed earlier in this Article. In order
to repair a society that is often fractured by race, it is important that real
solutions to racial profiling are discovered.
IV. COURT EFFORTS THAT MAY ASSIST WITH THE PROBLEM
A. Batson v. Kentucky
Assume that an African-American family is traveling on Interstate
10 from Lake Charles, Louisiana, to Houston, Texas, at approximately
3:00 a.m. This stretch of highway is known to law enforcement officers
to be a popular corridor for drug traffickers. A Texas Highway Patrol
officer notices the car with several people inside. The officer is unable to
distinguish the gender of the passengers or their ages, but he does
identify them as black. The officer follows the car for about two minutes
and stops it. He tells the driver that he was pulled over for traveling 68
miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour speed zone. He then asks the driver
where he is going at that time of the morning and why he chose to travel
so late. The driver explains that he is taking his family to Astro World
and to a baseball game in Houston. The officer asks the driver if he can
search his vehicle, but the driver denies the request. The officer issues
the driver a traffic citation for speeding, which is later dismissed by a
local prosecutor.
Id.
See KENNEDY, supra note 34.
Several informal interviews were conducted with Baton Rouge and New Orleans City
police persons and Louisiana State police persons who stated that race was not the only
factor used to help them determine whether a person is involved in criminal activity. The
person’s demeanor, such as if he ran when he saw police and his reaction to the police
encounter are more important than the person’s race. The interviewees suggested that race
was never the sole factor. It is a combination of several factors that will lead them to
investigate a particular person.
169
These other factors are based on the reasonable suspicion standard developed in Terry
v. Ohio, which is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 127, 132, 134.
167
168

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 3

650

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

It is highly unlikely that the officer stopped the vehicle because it
was speeding. This pretext was used to initiate contact so that the officer
could investigate his unilluminated hunch of drug activity. In this
instance, he has used the race of the individuals in the car to suggest
criminal involvement. No other plausible explanation exists for the stop,
and thus, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.170 The case of Batson v. Kentucky171 and the recent interpretation
of Batson in Miller-El v. Dretke,172 may provide insight on how to address
this and other impermissible uses of race or ethnicity in criminal
investigations.
In Batson, the Supreme Court found that an individual could not be
excluded from a jury solely on the basis of his race. The Court stated
that the defendant is guaranteed that individuals of his race will not be
excluded from the jury venire “on the false assumption that members of
his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.”173 By denying a
person the right to participate in the jury process because of his race, the
state has unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.174
Hence, the race of a potential juror cannot be used to suggest that he is
not qualified for jury service.
In Batson, the Court allowed statistical proof to show discriminatory
intent on the part of Kentucky prosecutors in their use of peremptory
strikes to remove African-American jurors from cases where the
defendants were African-Americans.175 The Court held:
To establish such a case, the defendant first must show
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that
the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire members of the defendant’s
race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the
fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits “those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.” Finally, the defendant must
show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor
170
171
172
173
174
175
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 95.
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used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the
petit jury on account of their race. This combination of
factors in the empanelling of the petit jury, as in the
selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of
purposeful discrimination.176
“Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts
to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging
black jurors.”177 The court then determines whether the defendant has
proven purposeful discrimination.178 The prosecutor must articulate a
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried, and his
explanation cannot be based on his intuition about potential jurors of a
particular race.179 That is, belief that the potential black juror is more
inclined to be biased in a case where the defendant is black is prohibited.
Applying the Batson analysis to an allegation of racial profiling
would require the defendant to show that the officer has purposefully
discriminated against others of his race when investigating criminal
activity. To do this, the defendant would not need to show an extended
pattern of discrimination by the officer.180 The defendant could make
out a case of purposeful discrimination by a totality of the relevant facts
surrounding the stop.181 Once the defendant has shown discriminatory
intent, the burden would shift to the state to articulate a racially neutral
reason for the police officer’s stop and investigation of the individual.182
Batson required that the State give a plausible explanation for the
actions taken by the prosecutor.183 Federal courts interpreted this
plausible explanation to mean any reason that the prosecutor asserted
for excluding a juror other than race or ethnicity.184 The prosecutor’s
explanation needed only to be facially neutral.

Id. at 96 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 97.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 80.
180
Id. at 95.
181
Id.
182
This statistical requirement cannot be the same as that mentioned in most cases
analyzing the Equal Protection Clause and racial profiling. The Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Miller-El v. Dretke gives us guidance on the type of statistical information that
may prove purposeful discrimination. 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
183
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 80.
184
See id. at 97-98; People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 355 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Peart,
197 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); People v. Duncan, 177 N.Y.S.2d 187, 193 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992).
176
177
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However, in Miller-El v. Dretke,185 the Court explained that the
explanation given by the prosecutor for excluding racial minorities from
the jury had to be more than just facially neutral.186 Specifically, the
Court concluded that some reasons given by the prosecutor may be false
even though they appear to be facially neutral.187 As a result, the trial
court judge may be required to look beyond the reason given to
determine whether there is an intent to discriminate on the basis of
race.188 Even if the trial judge or appeals court can imagine a reason for
excluding black jurors that might not have been false or can think of
some rational basis for excluding blacks, if the reason given does not
hold up when the totality of the facts are considered, it must not be
accepted.189 “A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in
thinking up any rational basis.”190
Applying this to a pre-arrest criminal investigation, the officer’s
explanation for making a stop must indicate an appropriate basis other
than race. This explanation must be more than just race neutral, it must
include factors that when considered in totality suggest to a well-trained
officer that the suspect was involved in criminal activity.191 The trial
court should weigh the factors articulated by the officer and the
defendant’s allegation of a discriminatory racial intent. If the reasons
given by the officer are weak and suggest a pretext, the trial judge
should find that racial profiling has occurred.192 The trial judge must be
willing to discredit an officer’s reason when strong evidence suggests
that his only motivation for making a stop was the race of the suspect.193
This will prevent an officer from camouflaging his true intent by
providing some illogical, yet race neutral, explanation for his actions.

Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. 2317.
Id. at 2325.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 2325-31 (finding that the numbers alone suggested a racial motivation for
striking blacks from the jury). Out of twenty black members of the 108-person venire
panel, only one served. Id. at 2325. Although nine were excused for cause or by agreement,
ten were peremptorily struck by the prosecution. Id. The prosecutors used their
peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members. Id.
The Court also looked at the side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who
were struck and white panelists allowed to serve. Id. at 2325-26. It found that the proffered
reason for striking some black panelists applied just as well to white panelists. Id.
189
Id. at 2332.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See Thompson, supra note 55, at 1001.
193
Id.
185
186

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/3

Jones: A More Perfect Nation: Ending Racial Profiling

2006]

Ending Racial Profiling

653

In the foregoing hypothetical situation, the officer’s explanation for
stopping the vehicle—that the car was speeding—is facially neutral.
However, it is very uncommon for an officer to stop a vehicle and give
its driver a traffic citation for exceeding the speed limit by only three
miles per hour.194 The most logical explanation for the stop is the race of
the individuals in the car and the officer’s intuition that people of the
occupants’ race, traveling that stretch of highway at that time of night,
must be involved in drug trafficking.
The Batson reasoning may also be applied to the five situations
identified earlier in this Article as accepted uses of race in criminal
investigations.195 In cases where race is a part of the suspect’s
description, the investigating police officers may not stop every
individual of the suspect’s race on the basis of race only. To stop every
individual of the reported race of the suspect suggests that there is a
pattern of intentionally investigating people of the identified racial
group without evidence that the stopped individuals were involved in
the crime.196
Such a pattern of indiscriminate stops of racially
identifiable persons shows a discriminatory intent on the part of the
investigating police department.
When making stops to investigate crimes in this situation, the
department must consider factors other than the suspect’s race. These
factors may include the time and location of the reported crime, the
nature of the crime, evidence of modus operandi that may suggest certain
known individuals, or other legitimate investigative leads.197
A
legitimate investigative lead must meet at least three requirements.
First, the information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the
criminal activity.198 Second, the information must be trustworthy.199
Last, the information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied
to a particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a
particular criminal organization.200 The race of the reported suspect may
be considered, but it cannot be used to suggest that persons of the
suspect’s race are guilty because they happen to be the right skin color.
194
I presented this scenario to three traffic officers. None indicated that he would have
given the driver a ticket. As a matter of fact, they all indicated that unless there were more
variables—such as the driver weaving, driving reckless, or bringing attention to himself—
they would not have even stopped the vehicle.
195
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
196
Id.
197
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9.
198
See id.
199
See id.
200
See id.
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The same analysis may apply when there is information about a
crime spree or where officers investigate crimes in a one-race
community. The officer cannot use race as an indicator that individuals
of certain groups are inclined to be involved in criminal activity.201 He
must be able to articulate racially neutral explanations for his stop and
investigation of individuals under these conditions.
In drug courier and border patrol cases, Batson and Miller-El may be
especially relevant. If Batson and Miller-El are properly applied, the
government will no longer be able to use race or ethnicity as the most
salient factor in identifying possible suspects. The suspect’s race or
ethnicity could not be a factor that supports some other facially neutral,
but illogical explanation for the stop. The government must show that
the officer’s stop of a person at an airport for drugs or the border for
illegal immigration was motivated by factors which suggest that the
person is involved in the suspected crime.202 Then the trial judge must
examine the government’s explanation for its veracity and its tendency
to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
suspect was involved in criminal activity.203
B. Bollinger v. Grutter
Another approach that may help ensure race is used properly in
criminal investigations can be found in Bollinger v. Grutter.204 In Grutter,
the Court held that race could be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way
to determine admission to the University of Michigan School of Law.205
The Grutter decision permitted the Law School to consider race as one
factor among many, in an effort to assemble a diverse student body.206
Race could be considered as a “plus factor” in an applicant’s file;
however, it could not be the sole determining factor.207 The Court
recognized racial diversity in higher education as a compelling
governmental interest, which may meet the strict scrutiny standard of a

See SCHOTT, supra note 138.
See Miller El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2317 (2005).
203
Id.
204
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
205
Id. at 2342.
206
Id. at 2345.
207
Id. “The Law School’s current admissions program considers race as one factor among
many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race.”
Id.
201
202
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reviewing court.208 However, to do so the program must be narrowly
tailored.209
In any context, an individual’s race or ethnicity is a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and racial classifications imposed by the government must
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.210 However, to
attain the important governmental goals of crime prevention and
detection, it may become necessary to consider the race or ethnicity of an
individual in qualified instances.211 But, a departmental policy that
encourages police officers to use race as the determining factor in
criminal investigations would offend the tenets of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “Textbook equal protection
analysis therefore suggests that when the police employ a racial
classification in investigating crime, the critical question is simply
whether this classification is ‘narrowly tailored’ to advancing the
government’s crime-fighting goal.”212 As stated in Bollinger v. Grutter,
when race is essential to meeting a compelling governmental interest, it
may be one factor among many, a “plus factor,” but not the determining
factor.213
For example, in the case of a criminal investigation where an
identification of the suspect includes his race, a police officer may
consider the race of the individuals he stops. However, he cannot
indiscriminately stop all persons of the suspect’s race. Other factors
must be considered and the use of race must be narrowly tailored to
meet the governmental goal of crime prevention or detection. Race can
be one factor among many, but not the factor that prompts the officer to
initiate contact with a particular person. The officer must consider the
location and time of the crime, possible escape routes for the suspect, the
gravity of the offense, etc. Race is only important because the officer
knows that he is looking for a person from an identified race. The race
of the individual should not motivate officers to stop a supposed suspect
for investigation.
When race initiates the stop, it is not used as a “plus” factor in the
totality of the circumstances, but rather, it becomes the defining factor in
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determining who to stop and investigate.214 Race becomes the “super
plus” factor that alone in the officer’s view warrants the stop. If race is
appropriately used as a “plus” factor among many factors, serious
consideration will be given to important evidence that suggests that the
supposed suspect is somehow related to the crime and is not being
singled-out solely on the basis of his race.
Even though I suggest the approach advanced by the Bollinger v.
Grutter analysis as a tool to help eliminate inappropriate racial profiling,
I do not believe that it is a cure-all. In border patrol cases and drug
interdiction cases where race has become an essential variable in
determining who to stop, it is important that governmental officers are
not given carte blanche to use the race or ethnicity of an individual in
such a manner that it becomes a “super plus” factor. In these cases, it is
almost impossible to prevent officers from giving great deference to the
supposed suspect’s race when investigating purported violations.215 The
officer’s experiences and attitudes when investigating illegal
immigration and drug interdiction crimes indicate to him that he should
stop individuals with particular physical traits.216 It is impractical to
believe that we can change the officer’s innate opinions or what he has
learned from his experiences while investigating these crimes.217
Because of his innate opinions and experiences, invariably, with or
without conscious intent, the individual’s race becomes the most
important factor that prompts the officer to make a stop.218
Accordingly, in cases concerning illegal immigration or drug
interdiction, a combination of Batson and Grutter may present a better
approach for eradicating racial profiling. This combined analysis would
allow race to be a “plus” factor among other relevant factors to give an
officer reasonable suspicion for a stop. However, because race is a factor
and it is given enormous weight by officers in these investigations, the
government must be able to articulate a racially neutral explanation that
would have given reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Assume that an officer notices a tractor trailer at the border with two
men that have a “Mexican appearance” in the cab. Because the men are
214
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crossing the border at a point where illegal entrance has been a problem
and they are using a vehicle that can transport several people, the
officer’s attention is peaked. The officer watches the tractor trailer as it
makes a turn from the main highway to a less traveled road. Unaware
that he is being observed by the officer, the driver of the truck pulls to
the side of the road. He and his passenger enter the trailer and appear to
yell at someone or something in the trailer. They get back into the cab.
When the driver notices the police officer, he becomes visibly nervous
and slows the truck to a snail’s pace. The officer pulls the truck over and
inquires about the itinerary of the two. Their stories are conflicting and
both are evasive. The officer asks what they are transporting; they
answer livestock. When he does not notice any ventilation for livestock,
or the smell that livestock generally emanates, the officer asks if he can
look inside the trailer. His request is denied. At this point, the officer
detains the two until he can get a telephone warrant from a local judge.
In the above situation, the first factor that became visible to the
officer was the Mexican appearance of the two men. However, a
combination of the other factors suggests that “Mexican appearance”
was not the defining factor for the officer stopping the vehicle. The
government in this hypothetical could articulate other factors justifying
the stop that are racially neutral, even though the ethnicities of the driver
and his passenger were factors.
V. CONCLUSION
Racial profiling is not a novel phenomenon. Because we have
neglected its effect on race and society, however, it has become a
crippling problem. Pre-arrest criminal investigations suggest that
officers are more concerned about a suspect’s race than whether he is
involved in criminal activity. As a result, it is oftentimes the race of the
suspect that dictates the officer’s actions.
It is important that efforts are reinitiated to end racial profiling.
These efforts must include more than mere discussions. They must
prompt affirmative action from the courts and legislators.
The
suggestions included in this Article are meant to reignite a waning
discussion.
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